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Church and State in Scotland:
The Articles Declaratory
Marjory A. MacLean
The	Church	 of	 Scotland’s	General	Assembly	 of	 2008	 established	 a	
Special	Commission,	due	to	report	to	the	2010	Assembly	on	the	future	
of	the	Third	Article	Declaratory	of	the	Church’s	Constitution.1	This	is	
the	Article	which	declares	the	Church	of	Scotland	to	be	the	national	
Church	in	Scotland,	and	it	is	the	Article	which	declares	its	functions	to	
include	a	territorial	ministry	throughout	the	country.	The	Commission	
is	given	the	ongoing	debate	over	planning	and	resourcing	as	its	back-
drop,	and	is	authorised	to	consider	the	effect	of	change	to	the	Article.	
All	sorts	of	outcomes	to	the	Commission’s	work	might	be	imagined,	
and	some	of	the	possibilities	would	have	implications	for	the	character	
and	self-understanding	of	our	denomination.
I	propose	in	this	article	to	offer	some	background	to	the	Church’s	
debate,	 and	 (being	 neither	 a	 member	 nor	 a	 staff-member	 of	 the	
Commission)	to	set	out	the	questions	I	ask	myself	when	I	wonder	about	
this	subject.	If	that	helps	to	extend	the	debate	over	fraternal	lunches	
and	post-Presbytery	glasses	of	orange	 juice	around	 the	country,	 the	
best	traditions	of	national	Church	debate	will	be	served.2
In	 this	 article	 I	will	use	 ‘Church’	 to	mean	 ‘Church	of	Scotland’	
unless	 otherwise	 indicated,	 which	 is	 not	 to	 imply	 that	 equivalent	
challenges	do	not	exist	in	other	denominations	in	Scotland,	each	with	
its	own	direction	of	mission.
The	Church	and	the	civil	magistrate	in	the	last	100	years
The Articles Declaratory
For the first 350 years after the Reformation, Church and state in 
Scotland	 tussled	 over	 questions	 about	 the	 spiritual	 role	 of	 the	 civil	
magistrate	and	–	the	corollary	of	that	–	the	independence	of	the	Church	
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from	secular	authority,	and	the	national	role	of	what	was	then	(and	to	
some	tastes	remains)	the	Established	Church.	For	the	last	90	years	the	
question	has	instead	been	largely	one	of	textual	interpretation,	since	
Church	 and	 state	 both	 declared	 the	 answers	 to	 those	 constitutional	
questions	in	the	Articles	Declaratory	of	our	constitution,	which	were	
appended first to the Church of Scotland Act 19213	and	 later	 to	 the	
Basis	and	Plan	of	Union	of	1929.
The	Church	has	the	power4	to	alter	the	Articles,	subject	to	restrictions	
stated	in	their	text.	None	of	these	restrictions	would	prevent	alteration	
to	Article	III,	nor	to	Articles	IV	and	VI	which	are	the	provisions	most	
of	 interest	 in	 constitutional	 debate.	 Article	 IV	 articulates	 at	 some	
length	the	independent	spiritual	jurisdiction	of	the	Church	in	certain	
areas;	while	Article	VI	expresses	the	spiritual	responsibilities	of	the	
civil	authority.	Article	IV	continues	to	form	the	basis	of	the	Church’s	
claims	to	some	legal	autonomy;	while	Article	VI	is	probably	regarded	
as	a	dated,	unrealistic	prescription	for	Scotland’s	civil	magistrate(s),	
and	it	is	not	considered	further	here.
It would, I believe, be difficult and artificial to consider Article 
III	and	IV	apart	from	each	other.	The	rights	claimed	under	Article	IV	
are	claimed	for	a	Church	 that	 is	somehow	‘national’,	a	Church	 that	
intends	its	jurisdiction	to	be	exercised	throughout	the	same	territory	
governed	by	the	civil	jurisdiction	it	seeks	to	exclude,	which	is	the	very	
territory	it	undertakes	to	furnish	with	the	ordinances	of	religion.	The	
responsibilities	 the	Church	 acknowledges	 in	Article	 III	 are	 claimed	
under	 the	 same	 dominical	 institution	 and	 mandate	 by	 which	 the	
Church’s	inherent	authority	is	defended.	Changes	to	the	Third	Article	
might	have	unavoidable	implications	for	the	defence	of	the	Fourth,	to	
which I turn first.
The independent spiritual jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland
The	Church’s	independent	spiritual	jurisdiction	exists	in	four	spiritual	
areas,	grouped	together	in	the	Barrier	Act	of	1697,	listed	again	in	the	
United	Free	Church	Act	anent	Spiritual	Independence	of	the	Church	
of 1906, and finally enshrined in the Fourth Article Declaratory. These 
are:	worship,	doctrine,	(church)	government,	and	discipline.
There	are	two	ways	to	assess	the	last	100	years	of	legal	debate	over	
the	Church’s	jurisdiction.	A	pessimistic	view	would	regard	the	Church’s	
page 7
area	 of	 legal	 autonomy	 shrinking	 over	 time,	 and	 see	 the	 advent	 of	
new	regulations	(e.g.	in	child	protection	and	charity	trusteeship)	as	the	
erosion	of	the	Church’s	previous	self-regulation;	while	an	optimistic	
view	would	 see	 the	 ‘new’	 regulations	 as	 addressing	matters	which	
previously	were	not	 regulated	by	either	 the	Church	or	 the	civil	 law	
–	which	 hardly	 constitutes	 an	 erosion	 of	 any	 substantive	 authority.	
The	 pessimistic	 view	 would	 regard	 a	 judicial	 decision	 against	 the	
Church,	 like	 that	 in	 the	 recent	Percy v. National Mission	 case,5	 as	
a	moving	of	 the	 jurisdictional	boundary	away	from	the	Church	and	
towards	the	state;	while	the	optimistic	view	would	argue	that,	in	the	
fog	that	surrounds	what	the	Church	means	by	that	word	‘discipline’,	
the	dividing	line	was	not	drawn	with	any	exactness	in	the	Articles,	and	
the	civil	courts	must	simply	declare	answers	to	questions	which	have	
not	been	put	to	them	before.
Sometimes	the	answer	to	such	a	jurisdictional	question	is	so	easy	
that	the	question	is	unlikely	to	reach	judicial	consideration.	Sometimes	
the answer is so difficult that only the judiciary can answer it. Imagine 
a	colour	spectrum	with	three	blocks,	with	red	at	one	end,	blue	at	the	
other	and	purple	in	the	middle.	Some	issues	lie	clearly	at	the	blue	end	
of	the	spectrum,	the	Church’s	end:	virtually	no	issue	of	doctrine,	or	the	
content	of	worship,	will	ever	be	successfully	prosecuted	in	civil	law,	
because	the	civil	law	has	no	reason	to	be	interested.	Some	issues	lie	
clearly	at	the	red	end	of	the	spectrum,	the	civil	magistrate’s	end:	the	
Church	operates	under	 the	country’s	criminal,	 taxation	and	contract	
laws,	for	example,	without	claiming	a	general	exemption	from	their	
terms.	Those	are	the	easy	examples,	where	one	jurisdiction	is	just	not	
interested	in	challenging	the	other.
Until	recently,	there	was	only	one	way	–	there	could	have	appeared	
to	be	only	one	possible	way	–	to	resolve	the	cases	arising	in	the	foggy,	
purple,	middle	ground.	One	jurisdiction	had	to	concede	to	the	other,	
and	if	necessary	it	might	take	a	court	action	to	force	the	concession.	
For	example,	in	the	Ballantyne v. Presbytery of Wigtown and Others 
case in the 1930s,6	the	Court	of	Session	declined	jurisdiction	in	a	case	
involving	the	right	of	a	congregation	to	settle	a	minister.
Recently,	however,	the	Church	has	resorted	from	time	to	time	to	a	
different	tactic,	passing	a	legislative	measure	giving	an	‘equivalence	
of	protection’	that	mirrored	a	very	similar	provision	in	civil	law.	This	
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involves	the	Church	on	the	one	hand	conceding	to	the	civil	magistrate	
the	 right	 to	determine	 legal	 rights	and	obligations,	but	on	 the	other	
hand	 insisting	 on	 designing	 and	 administering	 the	 detailed	 rules	
within	 the	 spiritual	 jurisdiction.	The	 tactic	 has	 had	 varying	 results.	
A	 successful	 example	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 Church	 legislation	 from	
2007	 addressing	 issues	 of	 bullying	 and	 discrimination,7	which	was	
introduced	to	ensure	that	the	Department	for	Business,	Enterprise	and	
Regulatory	Reform	(what	had	been	the	DTI)	would	not	try	to	provide	
civil	law	regulation	in	those	areas	for	inducted	parish	ministers.	In	a	
notable	failure	of	the	Church’s	tactic,	however,	the	House	of	Lords	in	
the	Percy	case	dismissed	as	inadequate	the	action	of	the	2002	General	
Assembly,	which	had	set	up	a	Special	Commission	to	examine	Miss	
Percy’s	claims	and	provide	a	remedy	equivalent	to	any	she	could	have	
received	 from	 an	 Industrial	 Tribunal	 under	 the	 Sex	Discrimination	
Act.
Is	 this	 ‘equivalence	 of	 protection’	 tactic	 a	 capitulation	 by	 the	
Church	to	the	civil	magistrate?	Is	it	pointless	for	the	Church	to	retain	
a	jurisdiction,	but	consent	to	populate	it	with	laws	mirroring	the	civil	
law?	 Elsewhere8	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 Church	 should	 not	 try	 to	
regulate	anything	which	can	be	adequately	regulated	by	civil	law,	and	
should	not	seek	to	maximise	its	jurisdiction	beyond	what	is	necessary	
to	 obey	 an	 authority	 higher	 than	 the	 civil.	 But	 that	 is	 exactly	why	
the ‘equivalent protection’ manoeuvre is justifiable. The separate, but 
parallel,	regulation	of	the	same	rights	and	responsibilities	is	necessary	
whenever	the	Church	needs	to	retain	the	ability	to	do	things	differently	
from	 the	 secular	world.	 In	many	 areas	 the	Church	may	wish	 to	 go	
further	 than	 the	civil	 law,	perhaps	setting	a	higher	demand	upon	 its	
ministers,	or	providing	a	greater	protection	in	some	area	than	the	civil	
law	affords.	Wherever	 the	Church	wishes	 to	 do	better,	 to	 do	more,	
than	 the	 civil	 law	 can	 do,	 there	 is	 every	 reason	 to	 retain	 that	 area	
within	the	ecclesiastical	jurisdiction;	and	if	it	means	some	duplication	
of	provisions	to	give	re-assurance	to	the	civil	magistrate	that	the	lesser	
secular	standard	is	being	fully	met,	it	is	neither	pointless	nor	weak	to	
do	so.
This	 argument	 only	works,	 though,	 if	 the	 Church	 always	 seeks	
to do better and do more to guarantee just dealings with its office-
bearers,	employees	and	members.	Surely	we	would	not	want,	in	this	
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day	and	age,	to	argue	for	an	independent	jurisdiction	so	that	we	could	
offer	less	protection	than	the	world	does.	If	we	did,	I	think	the	civil	
law would now stop us; and I have no difficulty with that.
The changing face of the civil magistrate
Over	the	centuries,	the	secular	authority	which	Reformed	writers	have	
usually	referred	to	as	‘the	civil	magistrate’	has	changed	in	nature.	A	
Genevan	city	authority,	a	Scottish	monarch,	a	British	monarch,	a	British	
parliament,	have	all	provided	different	kinds	of	challenge,	resistance,	
support,	 pretended	 support,	 and	 ceremonial	 partnership,	 ever	 since	
the	Reformation.	Things	have	always	been	most	 complicated,	most	
intriguing,	and	often	most	fast-moving,	when	the	civil	magistrate	has	
presented	more	than	one	face	to	the	Church.	The	Scottish	Reformation	
of	1560	was	characterised	by	the	Lords	of	the	Congregation	taking	a	
different	 position	 from	 the	Stuart	Crown.	The	 pre-Disruption	 cases	
unfolded	against	a	background	of	parliamentary	machinations,	with	
legislature	 and	 judiciary	 responding	 quite	 separately	 to	 the	 same	
debate.9	 The	 Percy case	 drew	 in	 arguments	 from	 European	 law,	
which	 long	post-dated	 the	Church	of	Scotland	Act	of	1921	and	put	
into	question	the	extent	of	the	protection	it	offers.	The	civil	magistrate	
changes and diversifies. The Church is rarely, therefore, in the position 
of	being	able	to	choose	to	go	back	to	any	perceived	golden	age	of	the	
past,	because	the	world	has	changed	too	much.
In	the	age	of	the	framing	of	the	Articles	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	
the	British	state	provided	a	unitary	secular	partner	in	the	discussion	of	
the	issue	and	the	provision	of	the	historic	legal	solution	in	the	1921	
settlement.	Today	Parliaments	 in	Europe	and	 in	Edinburgh,	and	 the	
constant	 proliferation	 of	 tribunals	 and	 government	 agencies,	 create	
a	 hugely	 complex	 civil	 law	 framework;	while	 the	 social,	 economic	
and	political	 impacts	of	untamed	globalisation	 reduce	 the	ability	of	
recognised	 authorities	 to	 regulate	 some	 things	 (e.g.	 the	 Internet,	 or	
international	missionary	activity)	very	effectively	at	all.
If	 the	Church	 seems	 to	 be	 unclear	 about	 the	 future	 in	 all	 these	
difficult areas of debate, it is because we are just like Gromit perched 
on a toy train, hurtling across the floor and frantically laying track 
just	in	front	of	us	–	section	by	section	so	fast	you	can’t	see	our	arms	
whirling	 round	 and	 round	 –	 just	 fast	 enough	 that	 the	 train	 has	 line	
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enough	for	its	forward	momentum.	It	may	be	the	glory	of	the	Articles	
Declaratory	 that	 they	 contain	 quite	 a	 bit	 of	 text	 that	 still	 means	
something	in	a	fast-changing	world;	but	that	change	is	the	process	we	
cannot	choose	to	stop.
The	current	debate
The Church of Scotland ministering to society in Scotland today
The	Church	 claims	 its	 legal	 autonomy	–	however	 far	 it	 does	 claim	
it	still	–	to	enable	it	to	minister	to	the	people	of	Scotland	according	
to	 a	 confessional	 basis	 and	 subject	 to	 no	ultimate	 authority	but	 the	
divine.	The	current	debate	about	Article	 III	 asks	what	 the	Church’s	
duty	is,	and	how	it	should	be	territorial	in	its	ministry	and	national	in	
its	character.
Assuming finite resources, and therefore ‘zero-sum’ calculations 
at	 least	 to	 begin	with,	 the	 Special	Commission	 has	 to	 consider	 the	
legitimacy	and	effect	of	any	shift	of	resources	(say	towards	centres	of	
population,	centres	of	existing	church	strength,	or	centres	of	particular	
evangelical	need)	which	would	result	in	the	abandonment	of	a	territorial	
ministry	somewhere	else.	What	is	the	test	to	tell	if	that	has	happened?	
The	 reduction	 of	 resources	 in	 a	 sparsely-populated	 area,	 or	 in	 an	
overwhelmingly	Roman	Catholic	area,	will	be	managed	by	the	union	
or	linkage	of	existing	Church	of	Scotland	parishes,	creating	larger	and	
larger	charges,	while	giving	the	appearance	that	the	National	Church	
still	regards	itself	as	reaching	over	the	whole	of	the	map.	The	day	might	
come	when	the	Church	would	feel	it	was	more	honest	to	abandon	that	
Article	III	language,	if	it	rang	hollow	in	places	largely	untouched	by	
our	ministry.	When	would	the	reality	of	the	territorial	ministry	have	
been	 abandoned,	 in	 practice?:	when	 someone’s	minister	 lives	more	
than	50	miles	away?;	when	more	than	three	small	islands	share	one	
minister?;	when	a	UPA	parish	has	more	than	20,000	of	a	non-Catholic	
population?	Questions	about	 the	meaning	of	 the	 territorial	ministry,	
and	the	state	of	it,	have	to	be	taken	together	to	make	sense.
So	 too	 do	 questions	 about	 the	 territorial	ministry	 and	 questions	
about	 the	 ‘national’	 character	 of	 the	 Church	 hang	 together.	 Here	
are	questions	for	a	debate:	does	the	Church	of	Scotland	exercise	its	
territorial	ministry	because	 it	 is	 the	national	Church	with	privileges	
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under	 the	1707	settlement,	or	 is	 it	 rather	a	national	Church	because	
of	its	willingness	to	reach	the	parts	of	Scotland	other	denominations	
do	not	reach?	In	other	words,	does	 the	Church	of	Scotland	have	 its	
current	character	for	reasons	of	history	or	geography?
What	would	constitute	the	relinquishing	of	‘national	Church’	status?	
Would the first abandonment of a piece of Scottish soil, anywhere, 
mean	we	had	lost	the	right	to	use	that	‘national’	label?	Would	that	step	
absolve	the	Crown	from	the	undertakings	of	the	Accession	Oath,	i.e.	
the	preservation	of	Presbyterian	Church	government	in	Scotland?
What	would	 result	 from	 that	 relinquishing	 of	 ‘national	Church’	
status? Would Scotland flourish better with nothing identified as the 
national	Church?	Would	 some	 of	 the	 expectations	 placed	 upon	 the	
Church	 of	 Scotland	 –	 for	 representation,	 commentary,	 ceremonial	
presence,	chaplaincy	to	social	institutions	–	be	transferred	elsewhere,	
to	other	spiritual	providers?	Would	those	consequences	happen	only	in	
the	places	from	which	the	Church	of	Scotland	had	chosen	to	withdraw	
its	presence,	or	would	these	be	effects	across	the	country,	reactions	to	
a	change	of	national	status?
And,	 picking	 up	 the	 earlier	 discussion,	 what	 would	 be	 the	
implication	for	Article	IV	of	this	kind	of	change	in	Article	III?	How	
many	changes	 to	our	model	of	national	mission	does	 it	 take	before	
the	 Church	 of	 Scotland	 is	 not	 discernibly	 different	 from	 other	
denominations	–	or	are	we	indistinguishable	already?	How	long	after	
such	a	 loss	of	distinctiveness	would	our	particular	 form	of	spiritual	
independence	 survive	 –	 or	 does	 recent	 legal	 history	 suggest	 it	 has	
already	 died?	 Which	 way	 do	 the	 dominoes	 lean?	 Can	 a	 national	
and	 territorial	 Church	 (an	 ‘Article	 III	 Church’)	 still	 do	 its	 job	 if	 it	
becomes	more	and	more	an	indistinguishable	subject	of	the	civil	law,	
unable	to	do	things	its	own	way,	to	its	own	standards?	Or	can	a	legally	
autonomous	 Church	 (an	 ‘Article	 IV	 Church’)	 justify	 its	 privileges	
if	 it	closes	 the	book	on	what	 it	promised	90	years	ago	would	be	its	
ministry?	Can	the	Church	claim	to	have	some	kind	of	jurisdiction	over	
a	society	without	extending	its	service	to	the	whole	of	that	society?	
And	if	either	Article	is	worth	letting	go,	shouldn’t	both	go	at	once	as	a	
gesture	of	integrity	and	humility?
Do	not	expect	answers	here	to	those	teasing	questions.	But	what	
steps	are	required	to	reach	any	answer?
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Principle and pragmatism
It	seems	to	me	there	is	a	sequence	of	questions	to	be	answered	before	
it	is	possible	to	answer	the	kind	of	question	which	has	been	posed	to	
the	Special	Commission.	They	are	the	questions	which	ask	how	God	
calls	and	directs	the	Church,	and	where	the	Church	hears	the	Spirit’s	
voice.
Those	who	 defend	Article	 III	 in	 its	 current	 form	usually	 do	 so,	
I	 think,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 principle.	 Is	 that	what	 it	 is?	Does	 the	Holy	
Spirit	 direct	 the	 Church	 by	 giving	 principles	 to	 follow,	 principles	
which	have	to	be	defended?	That	seems	to	me	just	a	little	too	much	
deus ex machina. God,	dynamic	and	sovereign,	cannot	be	bound	by	
a	principle,	but	gets	done	what	he	wills	to	do.	Article	III,	I	venture	to	
suggest,	is	not	a	matter	of	principle,	but	in	its	day	it	was	God’s	way	
of	getting	 the	Church’s	work	done	 in	 this	country.	 It	 is	a	pragmatic	
Article	in	response	to	a	divine	calling	to	the	Church,	not	a	principle	
derived	from	natural	or	divine	law.
So	those	who	would	defend	its	terms	need	to	do	more	than	say:	
hands	off;	you	can’t	touch	that	Article,	and	that’s	a	matter	of	principle.	
They	have	to	say:	hands	off;	the	mission	this	text	describes	is	still	the	
best	possible	strategy,	even	for	our	generation.	Or	they	have	to	say:	
hands	off;	too	many	other	pillars	will	fall	if	you	take	this	one	away,	
and the unintended consequences would far outweigh any benefits. Or 
they	have	to	say:	hands	off;	this	Church	is	called	to	preach	the	Gospel	
to	the	whole	world	(well,	Scotland)	and	not	just	to	the	bits	of	it	which	
amongst	them	produce	the	best	harvest.	Or	they	have	to	say:	hands	off,	
because	there	are	places	in	Scotland	that	will	be	reached	by	no-one	if	
they	are	not	reached	by	us.
Meanwhile	those	who	would	change	the	Article	need	to	do	more	
than	say:	let’s	get	rid	of	the	territorial	ministry	because	on	principle	we	
don’t	like	being	a	national	Church.	They	have	to	say:	God’s	kingdom	
is	strategically	better	served	by	another	system.	Or	they	have	to	say:	
the	Church	can	keep	its	autonomy	and	radical	obedience	even	without	
this	geographical	constraint	on	its	activities.	Or	they	have	to	say:	there	
are	ways	to	preach	to	the	whole	world	(well,	Scotland)	which	are	more	
efficient and effective than this. Or they have to say: there are new 
ways	to	reach	every	place.
The	 debaters	 of	 this	 immense	 constitutional	 question	 must	 be	
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careful	in	deciding	what	to	include	and	what	to	dismiss	as	they	try	to	
discern	God’s	will.	May	I	suggest,	though,	that	nothing	is	off-limits?
Conclusion
The	Special	Commission	stands	on	giants’	shoulders:	men	like	John	
White	 of	 the	Barony,	Alexander	Martin	 of	 the	United	Free	Church	
College	(New	College),	and	Lord	Sands	(Christopher	Johnston).	To	
honour	their	achievements,	and	keep	the	forward	momentum	that	is	
the	 calling	of	 a	Reformed	denomination,	 is	 the	 unenviable	 task	 for	
our	generation.	The	conclusions	which	follow	are	simple,	‘no-brainer’	
thoughts,	 designed	 –	 as	 I	 said	 earlier	 –	 to	 generate	 conversations	
around	the	Church.
The	civil	magistrate,	whoever	he	or	 they	may	be	today,	will	not	
allow	us	 to	construct	anew	a	settlement	 like	 the	1921	settlement.	 If	
any	part	of	it	is	dismantled,	it	can	never	be	recovered.	So	whatever	the	
Church	may	feel	is	right,	it	must	do,	but	if	it	does	the	wrong	thing	it	
will	not	reverse	the	damage.
There	 are	 many	 positions	 to	 take	 on	 the	 independent	 spiritual	
jurisdiction.	There	is	only	one	test	in	choosing	among	them:	what	do	
we require to defend to enable ourselves to fulfil radical obedience to 
Christ’s	radical	Gospel,	to	march	to	the	beat	of	his	unique	drum,	and	to	
be	different	from	the	world	when,	in	the	very	middle	of	our	middles,	
we	know	we	have	to	be	different?
In	our	Gromit-on-the-train	 role,	we	cannot	 stop	 laying	 the	 track	
in	front	of	us.	The	world	does	not	allow	us	to	stop,	and	anyway	the	
Church	is	movement	before	it	is	institution,	surely?
In	the	territorial	ministry	described	in	Article	III,	does	the	Spirit	
blow	where	she	wills?	Without	it,	is	our	land	becalmed?
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